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"Here's how it went. [A] client would hire me for a DWI or weed case. I'd
go to court and ask for a copy of the police report. I'd be told that they could
read it to me (no seriously, they would say this), or sometimes even let me read
it. But if I wanted a copy then I would have to file a discovery motion and then
they would withdraw all plea offers and force my client to trial. So basically they
set up a closed file system to bully defendants into pleading guilty without
looking at the evidence."1
I.
INTRODUCTION

Fifty years after Brady v. Maryland,2 defense attorneys around the United
States continue to struggle to get basic information from prosecutors. This is
even more of an issue in the ninety-four to ninety-seven percent of criminal
cases that are resolved by guilty pleas.' As the quote above illustrates,
prosecutors can use discovery as leverage in the plea negotiation process.
- Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Thank you to
Professors Catherine Hancock, Anna Vancleave, Peter Reilly, and Lisa Rich for their valuable
suggestions.
1. Robert Guest, Michael Morton Act Becomes Law - No More Closed Files in Texas,
DALLAS CRIM. DEF. LAWYER BLOG (May 16, 2013), http:///www.dallascriminaldefenselawyerblog.

com/2013/05/michael-morton-act-becomes-law-no-more-closed-files-in-texas.html.
2. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that ninety-four percent of state
convictions and ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are the result of guilty pleas).
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Unfortunately, the rule the Supreme Court established in Brady does little to
prevent this kind of gamesmanship.
In Brady, the Court required the prosecution to turn over "evidence
favorable to an accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment."' 4 The Brady standard developed, however, in the context of a case
that went to trial; thus far the Court has not shown an understanding of the
discovery concerns specific to plea bargaining. 5 This failure persists despite the
fact that our criminal justice system depends on plea bargaining and routinely
penalizes defendants who either do not plead guilty or who do not plead guilty
early in the process. 6 As long as prosecutors do not withhold exculpatory
information, Brady provides no protection against prosecutors who want to link
plea offers to discovery.
Fifty years later, Brady fails to protect defendants' rights in the context of a
system that routinely pressures them to plead guilty before they know the full
extent of the prosecution case against them and in circumstances under which
this inadequate information may mean that their lawyers are at a disadvantage in
trying to negotiate better deals. Equally troubling is the possibility that, in the
absence of good information, lawyers will be unable to fully explain to their
clients why they should accept that early "good deal." As a result, defendants
7
may ultimately plead out later in the process to a worse deal.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions on plea bargaining,
the time has come to reexamine the Brady standard in the specific and
predominate context of plea bargaining. Lafler v. Cooper8 and Missouri v. Frye,9
were companion cases in which the Supreme Court recognized the right to
effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining. These cases are noteworthy as
4. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
5. See Russell D. Covey, Plea-BargainingLaw after Lafler and Frye, 51 DuQ. L. REv. 595,
601-05 (2013). For a discussion describing Brady disclosures as they relate to the way plea
bargaining works in practice, see John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of
Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 452-57 (2001). For an earlier critique see Lee
Sheppard, Disclosureto the Guilty PleadingDefendant. Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy,
72 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165, 168-74 (1981) (discussing how plea bargaining works in
practice and the Supreme Court's incorrect assumptions about the process).
6. Various programs and individual prosecutors incentivize early pleas. See, e.g., Joseph P.
Fried, More Queens Drug Defendants are Pleading Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1988, at B8
(describing a special narcotics court unit that encourages earlier guilty pleas in Queens, New
York). For a study of the trial penalty, see, for example, Nancy J. King, David A. Soul, Sara Steen
& Robert R. Weidner, When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty
Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 992 (2005),
which reports trial penalties ranging from 13% to 461%, depending on the state and the offense.
7. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), is a good example of what happens when a

defendant fails to take an early plea and ultimately gets a worse sentence. The defendant refused a
"fast track" plea deal because it required her to waive her right to receive impeachment
information about witnesses or informants; when the defendant ultimately pled guilty anyway, she

was denied the benefit of the earlier deal. Id.at 625-26.
8. 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012).
9. 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012).
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signaling that the Court is moving beyond viewing trials as the "touchstone" of
criminal cases.' 0 As this article will discuss, it is time for the Court to recognize
that effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining requires that defense
lawyers have basic information about the case, both to fully advise their clients
and to effectively negotiate on behalf of their clients.
This article will first briefly examine how the Brady standard applies and
fails to protect defendants in plea bargaining. Next, this article will explain why
the recent Supreme Court decisions in Lafler and Frye demand that the Court
revisit Brady and consider defense rights to discovery in the specific context of
plea negotiations. The article will also offer specific suggestions for defense
lawyers to better protect the record on appeal for discovery issues for plea
bargaining cases post-Lafler and Frye. Finally, this article will argue for
legislative reform that would require open-file discovery as a remedial approach
in addition to waiting for the Supreme Court to more fully guarantee defense
rights to discovery in plea bargaining. In concluding that legislative action is
necessary, this article will use a recent change in Texas law as an example of
useful improvements while also illustrating specific problems that can occur
when policy-makers and legislators write a discovery law focused on trials and
thereby fail to protect defense rights to discovery during the more common
process of plea bargaining.
II.
THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND How DISCOVERY
MATTERS IN PLEA BARGAINING

The Supreme Court has left both plea bargaining and the defense right to
discovery largely unregulated."I The basic requirements for valid guilty pleas are
that the defendant should knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily accept the
plea deal and that this acceptance should not be due to improper threats or
coercion. 12 The Court has allowed what might be considered hard bargaining
tactics, such as prosecutors threatening to seek the death penalty1 3 or adding an
enhanced penalty if the defendant refuses the plea offer 14 as long as such threats
can be lawfully imposed. 15 "[F]undamental fairness remains the principle
10. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-BargainingMarket: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 1117, 1120 (2011). Arguably, this shift began with
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-69 (2010), when the Supreme Court held that effective

assistance of counsel requires a lawyer to advise her client of collateral immigration consequences
to a guilty plea.

11. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1124-27 (criticizing the lack of regulation in plea
bargaining).
12. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 750 (1970).
13. Id. at 751.
14. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978).
15. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 751 ("We decline to hold, however, that a guilty
plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's
desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of
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approach" that the Court uses in evaluating the constitutionality of plea
bargaining practices, including whether the plea is voluntary.' 6 However, the
17
Court has limited its definition of fairness to preventing "unfair surprise.'
Under this narrow concept of fundamental fairness in plea bargaining,
defendants have prevailed by arguing that they were surprised by the
prosecutor's breach of a previous agreement' 8 or by their defense lawyer failing
to advise them of the immigration consequences of the guilty plea. 19
The discovery that prosecutors must give to the defense is similarly broad
and, as stated above, not specific to plea bargaining. Brady simply requires the
prosecution to disclose "evidence favorable to an accused.., where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment. '20 The Brady Court expressed doubt
about whether a trial could be fair if a prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence, stating that "our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly."'2' Nevertheless, the Court has not specifically
required prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant before
entering a guilty plea. 22 Moreover, the Court has not yet clearly examined
whether failure to turn over discovery to the defense during plea negotiations
23
violates the plea bargain's fundamental fairness.
In the 2002 case United States v. Ruiz, 24 the Supreme Court examined the
question of a defense right to discovery in plea bargaining, but ultimately found
this right had not been violated. 25 Instead, the Court decided, in part, that a
defendant did not have a constitutional right to impeachment information before
possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the
crime charged.").
16. Josh Bowers, FundamentalFairnessand the Pathfrom Santobello to Padilla: A Response
to ProfessorBibas, 2 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 54-55, 56-58 (2011) (arguing that fundamental fairness is
the predominate standard for evaluating the constitutionality of guilty pleas because the other
standard applied to constitutional criminal procedure, accuracy is less applicable in a context in
which most defendants are guilty (i.e., the "results" are accurate); the better question, therefore, is
whether the process was fair).
17. Id.at 54.
18. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
19. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2010).
20. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 5, at 601-02 (explaining the circuit split regarding whether
Brady applies at the guilty plea phase and noting that most state courts have held Brady applies to
guilty pleas).
23. The Court has focused its analysis of fundamental fairness in plea bargaining in the
limited area of unfair surprise. See Bowers, supra note 16, at 58-59 (2011) (discussing Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) and noting that only in Santobello did the Court find
unfair surprise).
24. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
25. For a brief history of lower court decisions before Ruiz, see Daniel Conte, Swept Under
the Rug: The Brady Disclosure Obligation in a Pre-Plea Context, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App,
ADVOC. 74, 86-88 (2012). For a discussion of Brady and guilty pleas, including circuit conflicts
and Ruiz, see Covey, supra note 5, at 600-05.
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pleading guilty. 26 Pursuant to a "fast track" plea agreement, the defendant in Ruiz
would have had the right to receive any information relating to her "factual
innocence" but would have also been required to waive the right to impeachment
information about any witnesses and any information that might support an
affirmative defense at trial. 27 The defendant turned down that deal, as she was
unwilling to waive the right to impeachment information, but ultimately pled
guilty without the benefit of any deal. 28 The Court specifically rejected the lower
court's finding that failure to disclose impeachment evidence violated the
requirement that the plea be voluntary, holding instead that "impeachment
information is special in relation to the fairness of the trial, not in respect to
whether a plea is voluntary. '29 The Court further stated that "the Constitution
does not require the prosecutor to share all useful information with the
defendant. '30 The Court did not question whether the failure to turn over
impeachment evidence was a violation of the fundamental fairness required for
constitutional plea bargains. Indeed, the Court failed to understand that
impeachment information is useful not only at trial and in evaluating the chances
of success at trial, but also in plea bargaining because it gives the defense
leverage in the negotiation process.
The Ruiz case illustrates the overall attitude the Court holds towards plea
bargaining. The Court was concerned that requiring disclosure of impeachment
information would "seriously interfere with the Government's interest in
securing those guilty pleas that are factually justified, desired by defendants, and
help to secure the efficient administration of justice."'" Through this statement,
the Court made it clear that its main concern, in addition to efficiency, was the
"accuracy" of the plea, which means that the Court was satisfied of the
32
defendant's guilt and considered pleading guilty an acceptable outcome.
In Ruiz, the Court applied the Brady standard but failed to see that
impeachment evidence, even under the limited standards of Brady, is exactly the
kind of evidence to which the defense should be entitled. As stated above, Brady
held that the prosecution must turn over evidence that is "material . . . to
punishment. '33 In Brady, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. 34 The prosecution turned over many statements but failed to
turn over the one statement in which Brady's friend (and co-arrestee) Boblit

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 625-26.
Id. at 629 (emphasis in the original).
Id.
Id. at 631.
See Bowers, supra note 16, at 54 ("There are two dominant measures of constitutional

criminal procedure: accuracy and fairness.").
33. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

34. Id. at 84.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change

N.YU. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

Vol. 38:407

stated that he, not Brady, did the actual killing. 35 If this evidence had been
disclosed at trial, the jury might have agreed to a lesser punishment and not
returned a death sentence.3 6 In Ruiz, however, the Court was quick to dismiss the
potential importance of impeachment information in the negotiation process
despite its potential to similarly impact the defendant's punishment. 37 This
problem stems from the Court analyzing the relevance of discovery using a trial
model instead of a plea bargaining model.3 8 As a result, the Court failed to ask
what discovery might be needed during plea negotiations to reduce the risk of an
innocent person pleading guilty and the risk of a defendant getting a worse
deal. 39 The Court stated that "[i]t is particularly difficult to characterize
impeachment information as critical information of which the defendant must
always be aware prior to pleading guilty given the random way in which such
information may, or may not, help a particular defendant. '40 The Court does not
understand that impeachment evidence can impact punishment by giving the
defendant leverage in the plea negotiation process to persuade the prosecutor to
offer a better deal.
Ruiz illustrates how little the Court understands the plea negotiation process
and the potential value of impeachment information to ensure a more just
outcome. Plea bargaining is not simply a zero sum game in which the defendant
either accepts or rejects the deal; instead, plea bargaining is more often about
what the deal will be. Plea bargaining is often a fast and simple process, with
both felony and misdemeanor cases frequently pleading out on the day of
arraignment. In this fast-moving environment, as in every negotiation,
information is crucial. 41 The more a defense attorney knows about her client's
case and the prosecutor's case, the more likely she is to be able to work out a
deal that more accurately reflects the weight of the evidence. 42 While a plea
negotiation might involve the prosecutor simply making an offer and the defense
accepting it without further negotiation, this is not the only way that plea
negotiations happen. 43 Instead, plea negotiations regularly involve offers and
35. Id.
36. See Stephanos Bibas, The Story of Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship
Toward the Searchfor Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 139 (Carol Steiker ed.,
2006) ("Brady was not innocent of murder, but he could plausibly claim to be innocent of a murder
bad enough to deserve the death penalty.").
37. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 ("Of course, the more information the defendant has, the more
aware he is of the likely consequence of a plea, waiver, or decision, and the wiser that decision will
likely be. But the Constitution does not require the prosecutor to share all useful information with
the defendant.").
38. See Bibas, supranote 10, at 1132-34.
39. See id. at 1134-35.
40. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630.
41. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 5, at 450 ("In negotiation, information often is the key to
bargaining power. Plea negotiation is no exception to that rule.").
42. See G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 47-50 (2d ed. 2004) (listing the wide
variety of information that both sides should collect in preparations for plea bargaining).
43. See, e.g., JILL PAPERNO, REPRESENTING THE ACCUSED: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CRIMINAL
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counter-offers 44 that may be exchanged quickly at arraignment or extend over
days, weeks, or, in some cases, months. 45 Prosecutors will reduce charges, time
in custody, or both if there are "bad facts" in their case. 46 Impeachment
information is exactly the kind of bad fact that can help a defense lawyer
negotiate a better deal. 47 The final offer may change as the defense lawyer points
out to the prosecutor why such information could weaken their case, a
conclusion the prosecutor may not have reached without discussions with the
defense. 48 Impeachment information is just one example of evidence to which
defendants have no constitutional entitlement. Yet, such important evidence can
be the difference between a defense lawyer's ability to negotiate a better deal
and defendants being stuck with no option but to "take or leave" the original
49
prosecution offer.
The Court in Ruiz also did not consider that plea negotiations are multi-party
negotiations and are therefore a more complex type of negotiation. 50 Plea
bargains are commonly a "three-way" negotiation (between the prosecutor,
defense attorney, and the defendant) and often a "four-way negotiation" (adding
in the prosecutor's boss). 51 In some situations it may become a "five-way"
negotiation if the judge who needs to accept the plea deal is, for whatever reason,
222-24 (2012) ("If it seems the facts and circumstances warrant a better disposition, you
should make a counteroffer.").
44. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 42, at 83 ("As each side obtains information from the other
...the parties will make offers, counteroffers, and concessions toward fashioning a mutually
agreeable bargain.").
45. See PAPERNO, supra note 43, at 215.
46. See HERMAN, supra note 42, at 5-6, 17, 54 (advising defense lawyers to use weaknesses
in the prosecution's case as leverage in plea bargaining).
47. Id.at 92-94 (listing various defense arguments that can be used as a form of persuasion in
the plea bargaining process, and noting that the defense could use impeachment evidence to
question the motives of the complaining witness and argue that "the circumstances of the case
warrant a departure from the prosecutor's usual plea policies.").
48. See, e.g., Brian Gregory, Brady is the Problem: Wrongful Convictions and the Casefor
"Open File" Criminal Discovery, 46 U.S.F. L. REv. 819, 845-46 (2012) (noting how prosecutors
can fail to appreciate the exculpatory power of evidence due to "confirmation bias" and "tunnel
vision"). See also Fred Klein, A View from Inside the Ropes: A Prosecutor's Viewpoint on
Disclosing Exculpatory Evidence, 38 HOFSTRA L. REv. 867, 876 (2010) ("[T]he prosecutor who
has already become convinced of the defendant's guilt and who has little time to devote to further
investigation, ignores the importance of affirmatively looking for exculpatory evidence in his own
files, or those of the police, or fails to recognize the significance of such evidence of which he is
aware.").
49. For a discussion of how to handle take-it-or-leave-it offers or threats from the prosecution
see HERMAN, supra note 42, at 75.
50. Dispute resolution literature recognizes that multi-party negotiations are more complex
and multi-party disputes may be more difficult to resolve. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic
Barriersto Dispute Resolution: A Comparisonof Bilateraland MultilateralNegotiations, 8 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) ("A requirement of unanimity in multilateral negotiation, however,
creates potential holdout problems that may pose severe strategic barriers to resolution."). See also
DEFENSE

LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 208-14 (3d ed. 2005) (describing

challenges in multi-party negotiations, including the problem of coalitions of a sub-group of
individuals).
51. See PAPERNO, supra note 43, at 210-12.
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reluctant to do so. 52 As with a two-party negotiation, information is key 53 to
successful negotiations between multiple parties and the lack of information can
impede settlement. 54 This can be a concern that goes to the fundamental fairness
of the process, particularly during the negotiation between the defendant and his
lawyer. 5 In Ruiz, the Court barely mentioned that the defendant turned down the
"fast track" deal and later pled guilty without any deal (after unsuccessfully
asking the court to honor the earlier plea offer from the prosecution).5 6 The Court
failed to consider how the defendant's lack of information influenced her
decision-making, leading her to reject an earlier and better offer only to realize
57
later in the process that she wanted the original deal.
Ruiz is an example of the Court failing to see that information can be
material to the decision-making process of the parties during plea bargaining. 8
Defendants often do not trust their lawyers or believe that they are getting the
best deal when it is the first offer they have heard, and they generally do not
understand how the criminal justice system works.5 9 Some defendants are also in
denial about the strength of the case against them. 60 The more information the
defense lawyer has, the more they can work through those issues with their
clients and assist them to make informed decisions that often may mean agreeing
to take the "good deal" early in the case. 61 For the negotiation with the
prosecutor and his chain of command, the more information a defense lawyer
has, the more she may be able to convince the prosecutor, or more importantly,

52. See id. at 211; HERMAN, supra note 42, at 95-96.
53. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 5, at 450.
54. For a discussion of communication failures in the context of multi-party disputes, see
THOMPSON, supra note 50, at 212-14. For an interesting discussion of why people may follow the
group or polarize as a group, including due to limited information, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L. J. 71, 77-84 (2000).
55. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 42, at 62-64 (discussing the role of the client in plea
negotiations and how to advise the client).
56. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625-26 (2002). See also Bibas, supra note 10, at
1132 (noting that fast-track plea deals involve waiving more rights in exchange for "steep
discounts").
57. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625-26.
58. Bibas, supra note 10, at 1133-34 (discussing the Court's views of why defendants were
not entitled to impeachment and other types of evidence during plea bargaining).
59. See, e.g., PAPERNO, supra note 43, at 226-30 (discussing how to convince the "reluctant
client").
60. One of the reasons defendants suffer from denial is due to biases such as the
overconfidence bias which can exist even when a defendant has full information, as they will see
that information from the view most favorable to them. This problem can be even more acute when
defendants suffer from a lack of full information regarding the strength of the prosecution case
against them. See, e.g., Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive
Psychology and PleaBargaining,91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 217-19 (2007).
61. Defendants need to know how strong the prosecution case is, but under Brady they do not
have a right to this information. Covey, supra note 5, at 599. See also Covey, supra note 60, at 235
("Increasing the defendants' understanding of the evidence, and thus the accuracy of their
estimates of the likelihood of conviction, facilitates plea bargaining .... ").
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his boss, that this particular case deserves a better deal.62 Information can also
contribute to convincing a judge to accept a plea that she might otherwise
63
reject.
Information helps at every level of every negotiation that is part of the plea
bargaining process. Conversely, a lack of information can affect the fundamental
fairness of the plea bargaining process by, in part, having a direct impact on the
punishment the defendant ultimately receives or by preventing the defendant
from understanding the reasons to accept or reject a particular plea offer.
Defense lawyers need access to information, such as impeachment evidence, that
could be used to negotiate a better deal. In addition, defense lawyers need more
complete information to adequately advise their clients regarding whether to
accept the plea offer and to protect defendants from accepting or rejecting deals
without adequate information for informed decision-making.
III.
LAFLER AND FR YE'S CALL

FOR CHANGE

The Supreme Court has slowly moved forward in recognizing at least some
realities of plea bargaining. Ten years after Ruiz, the Court decided the
companion cases of Lafler v. Cooper6 and Missouri v. Frye,65 holding that
defendants have a right to the effective assistance of counsel in plea
negotiations. 66 These cases, while not revolutionary, indicate at least a shift in
the Court's thinking about issues surrounding plea bargaining and suggest that it
prosecutors should be
is time for the Court to re-evaluate what information
67
required to turn over to the defense prior to any plea.
The Court is no longer looking at plea bargaining as merely a procedure
necessary to "secure the efficient administration of justice. ' '6 In Lafler, the Court
explicitly stated what every lawyer and judge working in the criminal justice
system in the United States already knew: "criminal justice today is for the most

62. For a discussion of the hierarchical nature of prosecutorial decision-making see PAPERNO,
supra note 43, at 211-12. For recommendations to deal with the "plea policies excuse" see
HERMAN, supra note 42, at 72.
63. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 42, at 96 (recommending a strategy to ensure the judge

will accept the deal).
64. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
65. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
66. For a more substantive analysis of these cases see Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme
Court's Failureto Fix Plea Bargaining:The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q.
561, 573-76 (2014).
67. Arguably this shift began with Padillav. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). For a thoughtful
analysis of why Lafler and Frye demand rethinking what discovery defendants have a right to
receive, see generally Covey, supra note 5. For a more general discussion regarding how Lafler
and Frye will open the door to a broader range of successful ineffective assistance of counsel cases
see Richard E. Myers II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Rereading Cronic and
Strickland in Light ofPadilla, Frye and Lafler, 45 TEx. TECH L. REV. 229, 238-43 (2012).
68. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002).
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part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. '69 It is therefore "insufficient
simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any
errors in the pre-trial process. '70 The defendant in Lafler rejected the plea offer
due to his lawyer's bad advice and after a jury trial ended up with a significantly
higher sentence. 7 1 The Court rejected the argument that Lafler's fair trial cured
ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining phase. 72 In Frye, the
defendant never had the opportunity to reject the deal as his lawyer failed to
convey the offer before it expired. 73 The Court recognized that in these
circumstances the defendant was harmed by not getting the better deal due to his
lawyer's incompetence. 74 The Court recognized the importance of plea
bargaining and stated that "the negotiation of a plea bargain ... is almost always
'75
the critical point for a defendant.
Through Lafler and Frye, the Court now clearly acknowledges both the
importance of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system and that a fair trial
after a failed plea bargain is not a complete cure. This recognition opens the door
to reconsidering Brady in the specific context of plea bargaining. As stated
above, successful negotiation depends on information. Defendants who do not
have full information about their cases are likely to either get a worse deal, or not
fully understand why they should take the deal that the prosecutor is offering.
Lafler and Frye focused exclusively on specific instances of defense attorneys
failing to provide effective assistance of counsel. 76 And while ineffective
assistance of counsel remains a difficult claim for a defendant to win on appeal,
these cases indicate that the Court is more willing to look critically at the defense
attorney's conduct during plea bargaining. 77 In doing so, the Court must also
recognize that a defense lawyer who is not given full information about the case
can neither competently negotiate the best deal nor capably counsel their client
about whether he or she should accept the plea offer. And, as the above
discussion of impeachment evidence suggests, information that might be
69. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
70. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
71. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383-84. The defendant rejected an offer of fifty-one to eighty-five
months in prison after his lawyer advised him that he could not be convicted of "intent to murder"
because the four gunshots to the victim all landed below the waist. Id. at 1383. On appeal the
parties agreed that this advice was "deficient" as it was clearly incorrect. Id. at 1384. After trial the
defendant was sentenced to 185-360 months in prison. Id. at 1383.
72. Id. at 1388.
73. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
74. Id. at 1410.
75. Id. at 1407.
76. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383-84; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405. See also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
U.S. 356, 359 (2010).
77. For a discussion of the Court's failure to look more broadly at the problems defendants
face during plea bargaining, see generally Alkon, supra note 66 (discussing problems with plea

bargaining in three categories-prosecutorial power structures, legal framework structures, and
indigent defense structures-and arguing that the Court has only addressed problems in the legal

framework structures, leaving the rest untouched).
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material and relevant to plea negotiations can be different from that which might
be required for trial, making Brady's narrow focus inadequate.
IV.
THE DEFENSE LAWYER'S DILEMMA AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

Following Lafler and Frye, judges and prosecutors in many jurisdictions are
taking steps to make better records to prevent plea bargains from being
overturned on appeal. 8 Such steps include making statements on the record
about the plea offer 79 and providing forms that defense lawyers must sign stating
that offers have been conveyed to their clients.80 These jurisdictions seem to
recognize that at least some information flow between the defendant and his
lawyer is important to protect the integrity of the guilty plea.81
Jurisdictions that take steps to protect the record to prevent guilty pleas from
being overturned on appeal are exactly the kind of jurisdictions where defense
attorneys could successfully argue for basic discovery to assist in protecting
those pleas. In these jurisdictions, defense lawyers should frame the discovery
request as a way to prevent cases from being overturned on appeal, which could
happen if the lawyer failed to get basic evidence from the prosecutor showing
that the state can prove its case. For example, if a defendant pleads guilty to a
drug possession charge, the defense lawyer should see the test results confirming
the illegal nature of the item (for example, that the item was, in fact, heroin).
Failing to do so could bolster a defendant's subsequent ineffective assistance of
counsel in plea bargaining claim.
Defense lawyers may still face a dilemma moving forward. On the one
hand, they need to protect the record and establish when they do not have access
to the information they need for competent plea bargaining. On the other hand,
they need to avoid hurting their clients by insisting on this information when
prosecutors link discovery to plea offers and, for example, agree to give basic
discovery on condition that the defendant understands they are waiving the
offered plea deal. Until the Supreme Court decides a case specifically linking the
right to discovery with the right to effective assistance of counsel, defense
lawyers need to determine if they can clearly state on the record that the
prosecutor made such a threat without risking losing a deal the client wants.
Strategically, it might make better sense to fully document, in the defense file,
that discovery was not sought due to a prosecution threat to withdraw the plea
78. For a more extensive discussion, including some specific examples, see id. at 615-20.
79. Ellen Podgor, DOJ's Lafler/Frye Motion Goes Too Far, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF
BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrimeblog/2012/04/dojslaflerfrye-motion-goes-too-far.html (discussing Mot. Pursuant to Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v.
Frye (W.D. Tenn.), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/motion-pursuant-to-laflerand-frye-I.pdf (party names and date of filing redacted)).
80. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L. J.
2428, 2436 (2013).
81. Podgor, supra note 79.
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offer, but not put anything on the record in court. Another approach, after Lafler
and Frye, is for defense lawyers to state on the record what discovery they
received in advance of their client accepting the plea deal. 82 Again, this should
only be done if doing so would not risk causing the plea deal to fall apart or be
withdrawn. Regardless of what defense counsel places on the record, as they did
before Lafler and Frye, defense lawyers should be careful to fully advise their
clients about the discovery issues and their options in the context of the
particular case, and they should fully document those conversations.
V.
AN ARGUMENT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Beyond waiting for appellate relief, one recommendation is to change
existing legislation to require open-file discovery. 83 Legislation may provide for
quicker and better protection of defense rights than waiting for decisions from
the Supreme Court. It will likely take many years before the Court connects
effective assistance of counsel to the right to discovery during the plea process, a
link that will require a much more nuanced understanding of the plea bargaining
negotiation process than the Court currently seems to have. Legislation requiring
open-file discovery on the first court date (or earlier) could be a more immediate
improvement for the defense.
Most criminal cases are not factually complex. A large percentage of
criminal cases involve driving under the influence of alcohol or possession or
sales of drugs. 84 In these cases the prosecutor's information generally consists of
a police report, a lab report, and the defendant's rap sheet. Police investigation of
these kinds of criminal cases begins and ends on the day of the arrest. Turning
over this information is not difficult, particularly since much of it exists
electronically. In Tarrant County, Texas, for example, there is a long-standing
82. Though not required by Lafler and Frye, some courts have started to create more
complete records post-Lafler and Frye to prevent plea bargains from being overturned on appeal.
See Alkon, supra note 66, at 617-18. The recently-amended criminal procedure code in Texas now
states that before a guilty plea "each party shall acknowledge in writing or on the record in open
court the disclosure, receipt, and list of all documents, items, and information provided to the
defendant under this article." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.140) (West 2014). See also
Section IV, supra.
83. For articles recommending open-file discovery see, for example, Robert P. Mosteller,
Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical
Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 257 (2008); Daniel S. Medwed,
Brady's Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1533 (2010); Gregory, supra note 48, at 84546. For articles discussing the proposed federal Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act, see Bruce
A. Green, FederalCriminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REv. 639
(2013); Peter A. Joy, The CriminalDiscovery Problem: Is Legislation a Solution? 52 WASHBURN
L.J. 37 (2012).
84. For example, in Texas at the district court level in 2012, 27% of all criminal cases were
drug cases and a total of 47.8% were drug cases, misdemeanors, felony driving under the influence
of alcohol, or non-violent theft cases. TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 37 (2013), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/AR2012/AR 12.pdf.
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open-file discovery policy. 8 5 Implemented in the 1970s, this policy requires the
District Attorney to give defense lawyers all information except "attorney work
product and victim's and witnesses' personal information." 86 No lawyer should
ever have to negotiate a plea deal for their client without this basic information.
In the spring of 2013, the Texas Legislature passed, and Governor Perry
signed into law, the Michael Morton Act, which entered into force January 2014
and established open-file discovery state-wide.87 As this section will discuss, this
legislation changes the discovery rules in criminal cases and represents a step
forward for defense rights; nonetheless, the legislation has shortcomings that
future policymakers and legislators should consider before drafting open-file
legislation in other states or in the federal system. 88
Michael Morton, the law's namesake, was wrongly convicted of his wife's
murder after the prosecutor in his case withheld exculpatory evidence. 89 Mr.
Morton served twenty-five years in prison before a DNA test helped to free him
and to identify the man who committed the murder. 90 Mr. Morton's trial was in
1986, well after the Supreme Court decided Brady, yet the prosecutor, Ken
Anderson, failed to turn over two pieces of exculpatory evidence. 91 The
misconduct was so serious that Anderson was criminally prosecuted and
ultimately resigned from his position as a judge. Anderson pled guilty to
criminal contempt for withholding exculpatory evidence, and gave up his law
license. 92 He was sentenced to ten days in jail, a $500 fine, and 500 hours of
community service. 93 The Morton case illustrates one of the key shortcomings of
Brady: even when prosecutors are required to turn over exculpatory evidence,
they may fail to do so. Brady depends on prosecutors' judgment in deciding
85. See Brandi Grissom, Inmate's Release Brings Call for New Evidence Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2011, at A31.
86. John Council, New Open-File Policy Includes Appellate Info, TEXAS LAWYER (Oct. 6,
2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PublArticleFriendlyTX.jsp?id= 1202425008168.
87. Michael Morton Act, S. B. 1611, ch. 49, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 106 (codified at TEX.
CODE CRIM.PROC. ANN.art. 39.14 (West 2014)).
88. For an interesting analysis of the proposed federal Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act
of 2012, see Green, supra note 83.
89. See, e.g., Brandi Grissom, Morton's Murder Conviction Comes to Define Anderson, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, at A27.

90. See, e.g., Texas Man Found Guilty in Wrongful Conviction Case, CBSNEwS.COM (Mar.
27, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57576657/texas-man-found-guiltyin wrongful-conviction-case/.
91. For a longer description of the case, see Pamela Colloff, The Innocent Man: Part 1, TEX.
MONTHLY (Nov. 2012), http://www.texasmonthly.com/story/innocent-man-part-one; Pamela
Colloff, The Innocent Man: Part 2, TEX. MONTHLY (Dec. 2012), http://www.texasmonthly.com/sto
ry/innocent-man-part-two.
92. See, e.g., Jordan Smith, Former DA Anderson Pleads Guilty to Withholding Evidence in
Morton Case, AUSTIN CHRON. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/201311-08/former-da-anderson-pleads-guilty-to-withholding-evidence-in-morton-case/. Before charges
were filed, a Court of Inquiry held there was probable cause to issue arrest warrants for the
prosecutor, Ken Anderson, on charges of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence and
tampering with government records. See id
93. Id.
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whether a particular piece of evidence is exculpatory and should be disclosed. 94
As the legislative summary analysis prepared for the Michael Morton Act
explains, Brady was inadequate to protect against such problems because the
decision is "vague and open to interpretation, resulting in different levels of
discovery across different counties in Texas.' 95 The new law, which amends
Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, no longer allows for
prosecutorial discretion about whether to turn over exculpatory evidence.
Instead, the law requires prosecutors to disclose evidence that the state has in its
possession, such as offense reports or recorded statements of the defendant or
witnesses. 96 The defense has to first make a "timely request" but is no longer
required to "show good cause" as to why it needs particular pieces of
information. 97 The law, however, makes only one specific reference to plea
bargaining: "Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere ... each party
shall acknowledge in writing or on the record in open court the disclosure,
receipt, and list of all documents, items, and information provided to the
defendant under this article."98 This provision is helpful as it makes clear, and
preserves for the record, what information the prosecutor turned over before the
plea.
Although this law is an improvement, it fails to adequately focus on openfile discovery in the context of plea bargaining. The three basic problems with
this law are, (1) it requires a defense motion before the prosecutor is required to
turn over discovery; (2) it does not require prosecutors to turn over discovery at
arraignment; and (3) it does not require prosecutors to advise the defense of
anything that it may learn about the case after the guilty plea has been taken.
One problem with requiring discovery only after a defense motion is that
prosecutors retain the ability to condition pleas on a defense waiver of discovery.
The better approach would require prosecutors to turn over all discovery at
arraignment and put them under a continuing obligation to turn over newly
obtained discovery in a timely manner after arraignment. What "timely" may
mean could differ by state depending on how criminal cases proceed through the
system. For example, in a state like California, which has a preliminary hearing
for felony cases within ten days of arraignment, the obligation to provide
discovery could be tied to the preliminary hearing date or other specific dates
embedded into the criminal process. 99 The goal should be to provide specific

94. Others have written about factors, such as cognitive bias, that cause prosecutors to make
good faith, but serious, errors in judgment and fail to recognize evidence is exculpatory. See, e.g.,
Alafair S. Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1609-12 (2006).
95. ELLIS ET AL., TEX. S. RESEARCH CENTER, S.B. 1611 BILL ANALYSIS, Reg. Sess., at 1
(2013).
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2014).
97. Id.
98. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.140).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 738, 859a (West 2008).
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requirements that apply without requiring defense action, thereby preventing
prosecutors from threatening adverse consequences, such as withdrawing plea
offers, if defendants exercise the right to request discovery.
The second problem is that the Michael Morton Act does not require the
prosecution to turn over any specific information at arraignment. Discovery at
arraignment is crucial since so many defendants enter a guilty plea on that date.
As has been stated above, full information disclosure is paramount to parties
seeking to successfully reach a settlement. 00 The goal of an open-file law should
be to ensure that defendants receive as much information as possible from the
prosecution about the case as early as possible. The law's requirement of a clear
statement in writing, or on the record, of what information was turned over
before the plea could help to encourage full discovery before guilty pleas at
arraignment.' 0' However, the law does not specifically require disclosure of
information at this early (and often final) stage of the process.
The third problem is that the Michael Morton Act does not require
disclosure of exculpatory information after a defendant pleads guilty. Instead, it
only requires that "[i]f at any time before, during, or after trial the state
discovers any additional document, item, or information required to be disclosed
, , .the state shall promptly disclose the existence of the document, item, or
information to the defendant or the court."' 1 2 Consequently, defendants who
plead guilty may not later learn of evidence that could help them withdraw their
plea. As a simple point of policy, there should be no provisions written into a
law that give a defendant convicted at trial a greater right to learn of potentially
exculpatory information discovered after that conviction than for those convicted
due to a plea bargain. This provision illustrates the continuing misconception
that trials are the dominant process for resolving criminal cases instead of the
exception.
VI.
CONCLUSION

The decision in Brady provides little protection for the vast majority of
defendants who plead guilty every year. Defense lawyers continue to struggle to
get basic information and, in the absence of that information, to negotiate better
deals and to explain to their clients why it is in their best interest to plead guilty
early in the process. The Supreme Court, as illustrated in the Lafler and Frye
decisions, is slowly starting to recognize that plea bargaining is different and that
going to trial may not fix violations of defense rights in the plea bargaining
process. Defense lawyers should be conscious of the Court's change. They
should be sure to document their files regarding discovery issues. And, if it
won't result in prosecutors withdrawing plea offers, defense lawyers should state
100. See Section II, supra.
101. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.146).
102. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(k) (emphasis added).
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on the record the discovery they did or did not receive to better protect the record
for appeal.
Legislative reform, however, may offer more immediate protection to
defendants. New legislation should be written with the awareness that most
criminal cases are resolved through plea bargaining. This legislation should
require prosecutors to disclose information at arraignment, without a defense
motion. Open-file discovery legislation should also include a continuing
requirement that prosecutors turn over newly acquired discovery and that
requirement should apply even after the guilty plea.
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